Solution architecture outcome pattern: agent and its MCP servers
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The cp1-solution-architecture-agent and the sa-aws/azure/gcp-cloud MCP servers, a separate
stream from the individual and sub-agent patterns.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-11-05 22:13:25 +00:00
parent 8bb62a4a42
commit bc84ee4df6
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# ============================================
# Solution Architecture Azure - Environment Variables
# ============================================
# Generated by Agent Builder Platform
#
# SETUP INSTRUCTIONS:
# 1. Copy this file to .env: cp .env.example .env
# 2. Generate a secure API key: openssl rand -hex 32
# 3. Update MCP_REGISTRATION_API_KEY with the generated key
# 4. Build the image from the Dockerfile and run it where the MCP Gateway
# can reach it (see README.md)
#
# MCP GATEWAY INTEGRATION:
# When registering with the MCP Gateway, use the URL the Gateway reaches this
# server at; for a container on the Gateway's network, its container name:
# http://solution-architecture-azure:8116
# ============================================
# Server Identity
MCP_SERVER_NAME=Solution Architecture Azure
MCP_SERVER_ID=sa-azure-cloud
MCP_SERVER_VERSION=0.1.0
# Server Configuration
MCP_SERVER_PORT=8116
# Logging: level (DEBUG, INFO, WARNING, ERROR) and format
# (json = one object per line, for log stores; console = for reading by eye)
LOG_LEVEL=INFO
LOG_FORMAT=json
# ============================================
# AUTHENTICATION (REQUIRED for production!)
# ============================================
# This key authenticates MCP Gateway requests to this server.
# The Gateway stores this key and includes it in all tool/call requests.
#
# Generate a secure key:
# openssl rand -hex 32
#
# IMPORTANT: Keep this key secret! It's stored in:
# - This .env file (gitignored)
# - MCP Gateway database (encrypted)
MCP_REGISTRATION_API_KEY=<generate one: openssl rand -hex 32>
# Set to "false" ONLY for local development/testing
# WARNING: Disabling auth in production is a security risk!
REQUIRE_AUTH=true
# ============================================
# CREDENTIALS FOR THE UPSTREAM (sent with each request, not set here)
# ============================================
# The MCP Gateway sends the tenant's credential with each call, from the Vault Service.
# true: a call without one is refused. Set to false only for local runs, where the
# server may use its own environment.
REQUIRE_VAULT_CONNECTION=true
# ============================================
# Add your own settings below
# ============================================
# Credentials for the upstream are not set here: the gateway sends them with each request.
# EXAMPLE_SETTING=value

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# Environment
.env
.env.local
.env.*.local
# Python
__pycache__/
*.py[cod]
.venv/
venv/
.pytest_cache/
# Editors
.vscode/
.idea/

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# MCP Server Dockerfile
# Generated by Agent Builder Platform (template 1.1.0)
#
# Built on the platform's MCP server base image: Chainguard Python with the
# packages in requirements.txt already installed, a non-root user (1000) and
# no pip. This image adds only the server's own files.
#
# docker build -t <server>:<version> .
# docker build --build-arg BASE_IMAGE=<local base image> -t ... .
ARG BASE_IMAGE=kyndryl.jfrog.io/kc-ai-agent-factory-docker-local/mcp-server-base:1.1.0
# Stage 1: the server's extra Python packages, if requirements.txt lists any.
# The base image's build image (<base image>-build: the base image plus uv) installs
# them with its vendor-install script: only the packages added go on to
# /vendor, and one that would change a package the base image already has stops
# the build. uv never reaches the server's image.
FROM ${BASE_IMAGE}-build AS vendor
COPY requirements.txt constraints.txt /tmp/
RUN vendor-install /tmp/requirements.txt /vendor /tmp/constraints.txt
# Stage 2: the server: the base image, its extra packages and its files.
FROM ${BASE_IMAGE}
LABEL maintainer="Agent Builder Platform"
LABEL description="Azure documentation and read-only estate tools for the Solution Architecture agent, through Microsoft Learn, Resource Graph and ARM."
LABEL version="0.1.0"
LABEL server.id="sa-azure-cloud"
LABEL template.version="1.1.0"
COPY --from=vendor /vendor /app/vendor/
COPY server.py mcp_connection.py /app/
# Environment
# The ConfigMap's SERVER_PORT overrides this, so the container, Service and probes agree
ENV SERVER_PORT=8116
ENV LOG_LEVEL=INFO
ENV LOG_FORMAT=json
# Expose port
EXPOSE 8116
# Health check
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=10s --start-period=5s --retries=3 \
CMD python -c "import os, urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen('http://localhost:%s/health' % (os.getenv('MCP_SERVER_PORT') or os.getenv('SERVER_PORT') or '8116'))" || exit 1
# Run the server
CMD ["python", "server.py"]

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# Solution Architecture Azure
Azure documentation and read-only estate tools for the Solution Architecture agent, through Microsoft Learn, Resource Graph and ARM.
**Version:** 0.1.0
**Server ID:** sa-azure-cloud
**Port:** 8116
---
## 🚀 Quick Start
### As a container (recommended)
The Dockerfile builds the server's image. Run it on the same network as the
MCP Gateway, so the Gateway can reach it by its container name:
```bash
cp .env.example .env # then set MCP_REGISTRATION_API_KEY
podman build -t <image-name> .
podman run -d --name <container-name> --env-file .env --network <gateway-network> <image-name>
```
Register it with the MCP Gateway at `http://<container-name>:8116`.
### Local Development
```bash
# Install dependencies
pip install -r requirements.txt
# Set environment variables
cp .env.example .env
# Edit .env with your configuration
# Run the server
python server.py
```
---
## 📡 API Endpoints
| Endpoint | Method | Description |
|----------|--------|-------------|
| `/health` | GET | Health check (no auth) |
| `/.well-known/mcp-auth` | GET | Authentication requirements |
| `/messages` | POST | MCP JSON-RPC 2.0 endpoint |
---
## 🔧 Available Tools
- **azure_check_connection**: Test the stored connection: sign in and read the scope root. Returns no customer data.
- **azure_search_documents**: Search Microsoft Learn in free text. Queries are sent as written and logged.
- **azure_get_documents**: Fetch one Microsoft Learn page by URL.
- **azure_analyze_access**: List role assignments, optionally for one principal or below one scope.
- **azure_list_instance_attached_disks**: List the disks attached to one virtual machine.
- **azure_list_node_pools**: List AKS node pools.
- **azure_search_subscriptions**: List subscriptions.
- **azure_list_instances**: List virtual machines.
- **azure_list_instance_group_managers**: List scale sets.
- **azure_list_instance_templates**: List template specs and gallery images.
- **azure_list_disks**: List managed disks.
- **azure_list_reservations**: List capacity reservation groups.
- **azure_list_clusters**: List AKS clusters.
- **azure_list_services**: List Container Apps and App Service apps.
- **azure_list_sql_instances**: List SQL, PostgreSQL and MySQL servers.
- **azure_list_buckets**: List storage accounts.
- **azure_list_topics**: List Service Bus, Event Hubs and Event Grid topics.
- **azure_list_roles**: List role definitions.
- **azure_list_alert_policies**: List alert rules.
- **azure_list_dashboards**: List dashboards.
- **azure_list_connectivity_tests**: List connection monitors.
- **azure_get_instance_basic_info**: Read one virtual machine.
- **azure_get_instance_group_manager_basic_info**: Read one scale set.
- **azure_get_instance_template_properties**: Read one template spec or gallery image.
- **azure_get_disk_basic_info**: Read one disk.
- **azure_get_cluster**: Read one AKS cluster.
- **azure_get_service**: Read one app.
- **azure_get_sql_instance**: Read one database server.
- **azure_get_topic**: Read one messaging resource.
- **azure_get_role**: Read one role definition.
- **azure_get_alert_policy**: Read one alert rule.
- **azure_get_connectivity_test**: Read one connection monitor.
- **azure_list_assets**: List every resource in scope, or one resource type.
- **azure_get_node_pool**: Read one AKS node pool.
- **azure_list_commitments**: List reserved capacity orders, Azure's committed-use discounts.
- **azure_get_k8s_version**: List the Kubernetes versions AKS offers in one location.
- **azure_list_subscriptions**: List Event Grid event subscriptions.
- **azure_list_deny_policies**: List deny assignments.
- **azure_list_metric_descriptors**: List the metrics one resource publishes.
- **azure_list_timeseries**: Read metric values for one resource.
---
## 🔐 Authentication
This server uses Bearer token authentication for MCP protocol messages.
```bash
# Test with authentication
curl -X POST http://localhost:8116/messages \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $MCP_REGISTRATION_API_KEY" \
-d '{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": "1", "method": "tools/list", "params": {}}'
```
---
## 📋 MCP Gateway Registration
To register this server with the MCP Gateway:
1. Start the server (see Quick Start) where the MCP Gateway can reach it
2. In the MCP Gateway Hub, go to **MCP Servers** → **Add MCP Server**
3. Enter the server details:
- **URL**: Use the **container name** as the hostname (e.g., `http://weather-mcp-server:8116`)
- **API Key**: The `MCP_REGISTRATION_API_KEY` from your `.env` file
4. Click the connection test icon to verify connectivity
5. Enable the server
> **Note:** The URL is the one the MCP Gateway uses, so for a container on the Gateway's network use its container name, not `localhost`.
---
## 🔑 Credentials per tenant
This server does not hold credentials for its upstream. The MCP Gateway reads the tenant's credential from the Vault Service and sends it with each call, in `params._meta["com.kyndryl.mcp/connection"]`. The server advertises what it needs when the gateway calls `initialize`:
| Field | Required | Secret |
|---|---|---|
| `tenant_id` | no | no |
| `client_id` | no | no |
| `client_secret` | no | yes |
| `scope_root` | yes | no |
| `cloud` | no | no |
- In your tool code, read the connection with `get_connection()`, and reuse an upstream client with `get_upstream_client("<client kind>", build)`, which keeps one per kind and distinct connection.
- `REQUIRE_VAULT_CONNECTION` (default `true`): a call that arrives without a connection is refused, instead of using this server's own environment. Set it to `false` only for local runs.
- `verify_connection` is the tool the gateway calls to test a stored credential. It reports failure until you implement the check against the upstream.
---
## ✅ Check it before you push
`tests/test_conformance.py` checks the running server against what the MCP Gateway expects: it
refuses callers without its key, answers JSON-RPC correctly, and, if it declares credential fields,
takes the account from each request, refuses a call that carries none, names a missing field, and
never repeats a credential in a reply. It needs only `pytest` and `httpx` and imports nothing from
the server.
```bash
pip install pytest httpx
# with the server running (see Quick Start) and its key from .env
MCP_SERVER_URL=http://localhost:8116 MCP_REGISTRATION_API_KEY=<the key> pytest tests/ -v
```
A check that fails says what to fix. Run it again after you implement your tools, since a tool that
reads an environment variable for its credential, or repeats one in an error, fails it. Checks that
do not apply (a server with no credential fields) are skipped, not passed. To run it with
`REQUIRE_VAULT_CONNECTION=false` on your own machine, set `CONFORMANCE_EXPECT_FAIL_CLOSED=false`.
---
## 🚢 Deploying through the tools repository
To have CI build and deploy this server, put this folder in the root of the
`modernization-tools-mcp-servers` repository as `solution-architecture-azure/`, then add it to
`mcp_servers_to_deploy.yaml` in that repository with the instances it should
run on:
```yaml
- name: "solution-architecture-azure"
instances:
- az_dev
```
The pipeline reads `kubernetes/configmap.yaml` for the server's name and port
(`MCP_SERVER_NAME`, `SERVER_PORT`), generates the registration key and sets it
in the pod, and registers the server with the MCP Gateway.
---
## 📝 Logging
Every line the server writes to stdout is one JSON object (`timestamp`, `level`,
`event`, `logger`, `server_id`, and for a request `request_id`, `method`, `tool`),
including uvicorn's and your tools' own. Each request ends with one
`mcp_request_completed` line carrying `outcome`, `duration_ms` and `error_code`.
- `LOG_LEVEL` sets the level (default `INFO`).
- `LOG_FORMAT=console` prints readable lines instead, for local work.
- In your tool code use the module's `logger`: `logger.info("fetched_issue", key=issue_key)`.
- Do not log credentials, tokens or Authorization headers.
---
## 🛠️ Development
### Implementing Tools
Open `server.py` and find the tool implementation functions. Each tool has a placeholder that needs to be implemented:
```python
async def your_tool_name(arguments: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
# TODO: Implement this tool
raise NotImplementedError("Tool 'your_tool_name' needs implementation")
```
### Testing
```bash
# Health check
curl http://localhost:8116/health
# List tools
curl -X POST http://localhost:8116/messages \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $MCP_REGISTRATION_API_KEY" \
-d '{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": "1", "method": "tools/list", "params": {}}'
```
---
## 📄 License
Generated by Agent Builder Platform - Kyndryl (template 1.1.0)

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# Every package installed in a generated MCP server, pinned to one exact version:
# the ones requirements.txt names and everything they bring in. They are
# installed in the MCP server base image (Dockerfile.base), so every server
# built from this template gets the same versions as the platform's own
# services.
annotated-doc==0.0.5
annotated-types==0.8.0
anyio==4.15.1
certifi==2026.10.19
click==8.5.0
fastapi==0.143.2
h11==0.16.0
httpcore==1.0.9
httptools==0.9.0
httpx==0.28.1
idna==3.20
opentelemetry-api==1.45.1
pydantic==2.14.1
pydantic-core==2.50.1
python-dotenv==1.2.4
pyyaml==6.0.3
starlette==1.8.0
structlog==26.1.0
typing-extensions==4.16.0
typing-inspection==0.4.4
uvicorn==0.54.0
uvloop==0.23.0
watchfiles==1.3.0
websockets==16.1.1

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apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: <placeholder_for_mcp_server_name>-config # Do not modify, this will be replaced during deployment by the CI/CD pipeline
data:
# Read by the CI/CD pipeline: the server's name, and the port it listens on
# (used for the container, the Service and the probes)
MCP_SERVER_NAME: "solution-architecture-azure"
SERVER_PORT: "8116"
# One JSON object per line; LOG_FORMAT=console prints readable lines
LOG_LEVEL: "INFO"
LOG_FORMAT: "json"
# Leave on. The Gateway authenticates to this server with a bearer token, and
# turning this off makes every tool callable by anything that can reach the
# pod inside the cluster.
REQUIRE_AUTH: "true"
# Refuse a call that arrives without the tenant's credential from the Vault Service
REQUIRE_VAULT_CONNECTION: "true"
# Add your own settings here
# EXAMPLE_SETTING: "value"

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apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: <placeholder_for_mcp_server_name> # Do not modify, this will be replaced during deployment by the CI/CD pipeline
labels:
app: <placeholder_for_mcp_server_name> # Do not modify, this will be replaced during deployment by the CI/CD pipeline
repo: <placeholder_for_repo_name> # Do not modify, this will be replaced during deployment by the CI/CD pipeline
spec:
replicas: 1
selector:
matchLabels:
app: <placeholder_for_mcp_server_name> # Do not modify, this will be replaced during deployment by the CI/CD pipeline
template:
metadata:
labels:
app: <placeholder_for_mcp_server_name> # Do not modify, this will be replaced during deployment by the CI/CD pipeline
spec:
imagePullSecrets:
- name: jfrog-secret
containers:
- name: <placeholder_for_mcp_server_name> # Do not modify, this will be replaced during deployment by the CI/CD pipeline
image: <placeholder_for_image> # Do not modify, this will be replaced during deployment by the CI/CD pipeline
imagePullPolicy: Always
ports:
- containerPort: <placeholder_for_port> # Do not modify, this will be replaced during deployment by the CI/CD pipeline
name: http
# Load all environment variables from ConfigMap
envFrom:
- secretRef:
name: <placeholder_for_mcp_server_name>-secrets # Do not modify, this will be replaced during deployment by the CI/CD pipeline
optional: true # Won't fail if secret doesn't exist
- secretRef:
name: <placeholder_for_mcp_server_name>-dotenv-secrets # Do not modify, this will be replaced during deployment by the CI/CD pipeline
optional: true # Won't fail if secret doesn't exist
- configMapRef:
name: <placeholder_for_mcp_server_name>-config # Do not modify, this will be replaced during deployment by the CI/CD pipeline
# The registration key and server id are generated by the CI/CD pipeline;
# the server needs the key to accept the Gateway's calls
env:
- name: MCP_REGISTRATION_API_KEY
value: "<placeholder_for_registration_api_key>" # Do not modify, this will be replaced during deployment by the CI/CD pipeline
- name: MCP_SERVER_ID
value: "<placeholder_for_server_id>" # Do not modify, this will be replaced during deployment by the CI/CD pipeline
resources:
requests:
memory: "128Mi"
cpu: "10m"
limits:
memory: "1024Mi"
cpu: "1000m"
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /health
port: <placeholder_for_port> # Do not modify, this will be replaced during deployment by the CI/CD pipeline
initialDelaySeconds: 30 # Wait X seconds before first check
periodSeconds: 15 # Check every X seconds
timeoutSeconds: 10 # Each check can take up to X seconds to respond
failureThreshold: 5 # Allow X consecutive failures before marking unhealthy
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /health
port: <placeholder_for_port> # Do not modify, this will be replaced during deployment by the CI/CD pipeline
initialDelaySeconds: 30 # Wait X seconds before first check
periodSeconds: 15 # Check every X seconds
timeoutSeconds: 10 # Each check can take up to X seconds to respond
failureThreshold: 5 # Allow X consecutive failures before marking unhealthy
# volumes:
# - name: execution-storage
# persistentVolumeClaim:
# claimName: execution-storage-pvc # Same PVC name as core-components

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apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- namespace.yaml
- deployment.yaml
- service.yaml
- configmap.yaml
- secretnames.yaml
# Optionally add common labels
# Namespace for all resources
namespace: mcp-servers
labels:
- includeSelectors: true
pairs:
app: <placeholder_for_mcp_server_name> # Do not modify, this will be replaced during deployment by the CI/CD pipeline
environment: production
repo: <placeholder_for_repo_name> # Do not modify, this will be replaced during deployment by the CI/CD pipeline

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# Do not modify this file, otherwise CI/CD pipeline will fail
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: mcp-servers
labels:
name: mcp-servers

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apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: <placeholder_for_mcp_server_name>-secrets
type: Opaque
data:
# Base64 encoded values (NOT RECOMMENDED for sensitive data)
# To encode: echo -n 'your-secret-value' | base64
# Example: api-key: eW91ci1hcGkta2V5LXZhbHVl
stringData:
# Plain text values saved on GitHub Secrets (RECOMMENDED)
# Example:
#
# DB_PASSWORD: ${DB_PASSWORD_GITHUB_SECRET}
# ANOTHER_SECRET: ${ANOTHER_GITHUB_SECRET}
#
# ${DB_PASSWORD_GITHUB_SECRET} and ${ANOTHER_GITHUB_SECRET} must exist as GitHub Secrets

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apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: <placeholder_for_mcp_server_name>
labels:
app: <placeholder_for_mcp_server_name>
repo: <placeholder_for_repo_name> # Do not modify, this will be replaced during deployment by the CI/CD pipeline
spec:
type: ClusterIP
ports:
- port: <placeholder_for_port> # Do not modify, this will be replaced during deployment by the CI/CD pipeline
targetPort: <placeholder_for_port> # Do not modify, this will be replaced during deployment by the CI/CD pipeline
protocol: TCP
name: http
selector:
app: <placeholder_for_mcp_server_name>
---
# Optional: LoadBalancer service for external access
# apiVersion: v1
# kind: Service
# metadata:
# name: <placeholder_for_mcp_server_name>-external
# labels:
# app: <placeholder_for_mcp_server_name>
# spec:
# type: LoadBalancer
# ports:
# - port: 80
# targetPort: 8080
# protocol: TCP
# name: http
# selector:
# app: <placeholder_for_mcp_server_name>

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"""The connection a request carries: which upstream account this call is for.
An MCP server that talks to a third-party system needs that system's address and credentials. Taking
them from environment variables makes one process serve one account for ever. Here the MCP Gateway
sends them with each call, from the Vault Service, in MCP's own `_meta` field, under our vendor prefix:
initialize result _meta["com.kyndryl.mcp/connection-schema"] what this server needs (JSON Schema)
_meta["com.kyndryl.mcp/verify-tool"] the tool that tests a connection
tools/call, resources/read, prompts/get
params._meta["com.kyndryl.mcp/connection"] the values, matching that schema
`_meta` is where the specification tells implementations to put their own data, so a client that does
not know these keys ignores them. The values never travel in `arguments`, which is what the model
writes and reads, so a credential cannot enter the model's context.
The connection is bound for the life of one request and read with `active()`. It is None when the caller
sent nothing; whether the server may then use its own environment is decided in server.py
(REQUIRE_VAULT_CONNECTION, which is on by default).
WHAT IS STANDARD AND WHAT IS OURS
---------------------------------
The mechanism is standard. `_meta` is the specification's sanctioned place for implementation-specific
data, with formal key-naming rules (2026-07-28, "General fields / _meta"):
Prefix ... SHOULD use reverse DNS notation. Any prefix where the second label is
`modelcontextprotocol` or `mcp` is reserved for MCP use ... third-party extensions use their own
vendor prefix.
`com.kyndryl.mcp/` satisfies that: the second label is `kyndryl`, so it is a legitimate vendor prefix and
not reserved. A client that does not recognise our keys ignores them, which is exactly what `_meta` is for.
The value carried is a *separate* upstream credential, never the caller's own token (the specification
says a server MUST NOT pass through the token it received from its client).
Only the three key names and the shape of their payloads are ours. When SEP-2127 (MCP Server Card) lands,
the schema is what moves onto the card, and the key names are the only thing that changes.
The third key, VERIFY_TOOL_KEY, adds very little. Checking a credential is a plain `tools/call` against an
ordinary tool that appears in `tools/list` like any other: no new method, no new transport. The only
question that needed answering is WHICH tool, and the alternative was for the gateway to guess by name. A
server that advertises nothing here is simply not verifiable.
STATELESSNESS
-------------
The 2026-07-28 specification made MCP explicitly stateless: "Servers MUST NOT rely on prior requests over
the same connection to establish context ... Every request supplies this metadata in its _meta field."
A module-level connection built once at import is exactly the state the specification tells servers not to
keep. Binding the connection per request is therefore not only what multi-tenancy needs, it is what the
protocol asks for.
HOW IT IS USED (server.py does all of this; a tool only calls get_connection())
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
import mcp_connection
# advertise, in the initialize result
result["_meta"] = mcp_connection.schema_meta(CONNECTION_SCHEMA, verify_tool="verify_connection")
# bind, for the life of one request
token = mcp_connection.bind(mcp_connection.from_params(request.params))
try:
... # mcp_connection.active() anywhere below
finally:
mcp_connection.unbind(token)
LOGS AND ERROR MESSAGES
-----------------------
`scrub()` is applied to every log line, and to the `error` text of a failed tool call, so the connection's
values and credential-looking URL parameters (`?key=...`) never leave the process. `redact()` does the
connection values alone. Neither is applied to a successful result: a presigned URL a tool returns on
purpose must survive.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import contextvars
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import re
import secrets
from typing import Any, Callable, Dict, List, Optional
VENDOR = "com.kyndryl.mcp"
SCHEMA_KEY = f"{VENDOR}/connection-schema"
CONNECTION_KEY = f"{VENDOR}/connection"
VERIFY_TOOL_KEY = f"{VENDOR}/verify-tool"
_active: contextvars.ContextVar[Optional[Dict[str, Any]]] = contextvars.ContextVar(
"mcp_connection", default=None
)
# Per process, so a fingerprint in a log cannot be checked against a guessed credential offline
_FINGERPRINT_KEY = secrets.token_bytes(32)
def schema_meta(schema: Dict[str, Any], verify_tool: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""The `_meta` object that advertises `schema` on an initialize result."""
meta: Dict[str, Any] = {SCHEMA_KEY: schema}
if verify_tool:
meta[VERIFY_TOOL_KEY] = verify_tool
return meta
def verify_tool_from_initialize(result: Optional[Dict[str, Any]]) -> Optional[str]:
"""The verify tool an initialize result advertises, or None.
The reader half of schema_meta, here rather than in the gateway so the two ends of the key cannot
drift apart.
"""
if not isinstance(result, dict):
return None
meta = result.get("_meta")
if not isinstance(meta, dict):
return None
name = meta.get(VERIFY_TOOL_KEY)
return name if isinstance(name, str) and name.strip() else None
def from_params(params: Optional[Dict[str, Any]]) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""The connection in a request's `params._meta`, or None.
Anything that is not an object counts as absent: a malformed connection must not be more
powerful than none at all.
"""
if not isinstance(params, dict):
return None
meta = params.get("_meta")
if not isinstance(meta, dict):
return None
profile = meta.get(CONNECTION_KEY)
return profile if isinstance(profile, dict) and profile else None
def bind(profile: Optional[Dict[str, Any]]) -> contextvars.Token:
"""Make `profile` the connection for this request."""
return _active.set(profile)
def unbind(token: contextvars.Token) -> None:
try:
_active.reset(token)
except ValueError:
_active.set(None)
def active() -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""The connection for this request, or None."""
return _active.get()
def fingerprint(profile: Optional[Dict[str, Any]]) -> str:
"""A short id for a connection, safe to log and to cache on; the credential never is the key."""
if not profile:
return "env"
canonical = json.dumps(profile, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), default=str)
return hmac.new(_FINGERPRINT_KEY, canonical.encode("utf-8"), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()[:16]
def redact(text: Any) -> str:
"""`text` with every value of this request's connection replaced, for logs and error replies.
A tool can put a credential in an exception message without meaning to. Values shorter than four
characters are left alone: replacing them would garble ordinary text.
"""
result = str(text)
values = [v for v in (active() or {}).values() if isinstance(v, str) and len(v) >= 4]
for value in sorted(values, key=len, reverse=True):
result = result.replace(value, "[redacted]")
return result
# Query parameters that carry a credential in the URL of an upstream request
_URL_CREDENTIAL = re.compile(
r"([?&;](?:api[_-]?key|apikey|key|token|access[_-]?token|auth|secret|password|passwd|"
r"client[_-]?secret|appid|app[_-]?id|sig|signature)=)[^&\s\"'#<>]+",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
def scrub(value: Any, _depth: int = 0) -> Any:
"""`value` with credentials taken out, for anything that is logged or sent back to a caller.
Strings lose the request's connection values and the value of any credential query parameter in a
URL (`?key=...`); dicts, lists and tuples are scrubbed inside. Anything else is returned as it is.
Not for tool results in general: a presigned URL a tool returns on purpose would be damaged.
"""
if isinstance(value, str):
return _URL_CREDENTIAL.sub(r"\1[redacted]", redact(value))
if _depth > 5:
return value
if isinstance(value, dict):
return {k: scrub(v, _depth + 1) for k, v in value.items()}
if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
return type(value)(scrub(v, _depth + 1) for v in value)
return value
def missing_fields(profile: Optional[Dict[str, Any]], schema: Dict[str, Any]) -> List[str]:
"""The required fields of `schema` that `profile` does not supply."""
if not profile:
return []
required = schema.get("required") or []
return [name for name in required if not str(profile.get(name) or "").strip()]
def install_invalid_request_handler(app: Any, on_invalid: Optional[Callable[[str], None]] = None) -> None:
"""Answer a request that is not valid JSON-RPC with a JSON-RPC error that does not repeat the request.
FastAPI's own answer (HTTP 422) repeats the request body under "input". The body is where the gateway puts
the tenant's connection, so a request that is merely malformed (no "id", say) would get the credential back
in the reply, and in the log of anything that records replies. The status stays 422; the body is a JSON-RPC
error (-32600) that names only the fields at fault. `on_invalid`, if given, is called with that text, already
reduced to harmless characters, so the caller can log it in its own style.
Call it once, right after `app = FastAPI(...)`. FastAPI is imported here, not at module level, so the rest of
this module stays importable without it.
"""
from fastapi.exceptions import RequestValidationError
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
@app.exception_handler(RequestValidationError)
async def invalid_request(request, exc):
names = {
"body" if error.get("type") == "json_invalid" else ".".join(str(p) for p in error.get("loc", ())[1:]) or "body"
for error in exc.errors()
}
fields = re.sub(r"[^\w.\-, ]", "?", ", ".join(sorted(names)))[:200]
if on_invalid is not None:
on_invalid(fields)
return JSONResponse(
status_code=422,
content={
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": None,
"result": None,
"error": {"code": -32600, "message": "Invalid request: check " + fields},
},
)
__all__ = [
"install_invalid_request_handler",
"VENDOR",
"SCHEMA_KEY",
"CONNECTION_KEY",
"VERIFY_TOOL_KEY",
"schema_meta",
"verify_tool_from_initialize",
"from_params",
"bind",
"unbind",
"active",
"fingerprint",
"redact",
"scrub",
"missing_fields",
]

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# MCP Server Dependencies
# Generated by Agent Builder Platform
# Each dependency is pinned to one exact version, and constraints.txt pins everything they bring
# in, so two builds of the same server get the same packages -- the same versions as the
# platform's own services. The packages below are already installed in the MCP server base
# image the Dockerfile builds on; a package added to this file is installed on top of them at
# build time. Changing the version of one the base has stops the build: the base image moves
# those, with the template.
# Core Framework
# FastAPI - Modern web framework for MCP server
fastapi==0.143.2
# ASGI Server
# Uvicorn - Lightning-fast ASGI server
uvicorn[standard]==0.54.0
# Data Validation
# Pydantic - Data validation using Python type hints
pydantic==2.14.1
# HTTP Client
# HTTPX - Async HTTP client for API calls
httpx==0.28.1
# Environment Variables
# python-dotenv - Load environment from .env files
python-dotenv==1.2.4
# Structured Logging
# structlog - JSON log lines (see LOG_FORMAT in server.py)
structlog==26.1.0
# Optional: Add your custom dependencies below
# requests>=2.31.0
# aiofiles>=23.2.1
# sqlalchemy>=2.0.0
# redis>=5.0.0
# Added by this server's definition
boto3==1.43.122

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"""Conformance checks for an MCP server that takes its upstream credentials from the MCP Gateway.
Run these against a running server before you push it. They need only `pytest` and `httpx`, import
nothing from the server and talk to it over HTTP, so they work on a server from the MCP Server
Builder and on one written by hand.
pip install pytest httpx
MCP_SERVER_URL=http://localhost:8100 MCP_REGISTRATION_API_KEY=<the server's key> pytest tests/ -v
What is checked, and why:
Protocol the server answers /health, refuses callers without its key, and speaks JSON-RPC
correctly (initialize, tools/list, ids echoed, errors as errors).
Connection a server that needs an upstream account says so in its initialize result
(`_meta["com.kyndryl.mcp/connection-schema"]`) and takes the account from each
request (`params._meta["com.kyndryl.mcp/connection"]`), not from its own environment.
Such a server refuses a call that carries none (fail closed), reports which required
field is missing, takes nothing from `arguments`, and never repeats a credential in a
reply (the values of fields marked `writeOnly`; every value if none is marked). A server that needs no account skips these checks.
Settings (environment variables):
MCP_SERVER_URL default http://localhost:8100
MCP_REGISTRATION_API_KEY the key the server was started with (required unless the
server has authentication switched off)
CONFORMANCE_EXPECT_FAIL_CLOSED default true. Set false only for a server you run locally
with REQUIRE_VAULT_CONNECTION=false, so that checks which
need a refusal are skipped rather than failed.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import secrets
import uuid
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
import httpx
import pytest
VENDOR = "com.kyndryl.mcp"
SCHEMA_KEY = f"{VENDOR}/connection-schema"
VERIFY_TOOL_KEY = f"{VENDOR}/verify-tool"
CONNECTION_KEY = f"{VENDOR}/connection"
BASE_URL = os.getenv("MCP_SERVER_URL", "http://localhost:8100").rstrip("/")
API_KEY = os.getenv("MCP_REGISTRATION_API_KEY", "")
EXPECT_FAIL_CLOSED = os.getenv("CONFORMANCE_EXPECT_FAIL_CLOSED", "true").strip().lower() != "false"
# A value no server could contain by accident, so finding it in a reply means the server repeated it.
SENTINEL = f"sentinel-{secrets.token_hex(6)}"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ helpers
def auth_headers(key: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict[str, str]:
key = API_KEY if key is None else key
return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {key}"} if key else {}
def rpc(
client: httpx.Client,
method: str,
params: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
*,
request_id: Any = "1",
headers: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None,
) -> httpx.Response:
return client.post(
"/messages",
json={"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": request_id, "method": method, "params": params or {}},
headers=auth_headers() if headers is None else headers,
)
def result_of(client: httpx.Client, method: str, params: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
response = rpc(client, method, params)
assert response.status_code == 200, f"{method} answered HTTP {response.status_code}: {response.text[:300]}"
body = response.json()
assert not body.get("error"), f"{method} returned an error: {body['error']}"
return body["result"]
def with_connection(params: Dict[str, Any], connection: Optional[Dict[str, Any]]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
if connection is None:
return params
return {**params, "_meta": {CONNECTION_KEY: connection}}
def value_for(name: str, spec: Dict[str, Any]) -> Any:
"""A value of the right shape for a connection field, carrying the sentinel."""
kind = spec.get("type", "string")
if kind == "string" and spec.get("format") == "uri":
return f"https://{SENTINEL}.invalid"
if kind == "integer":
return 12345
if kind == "boolean":
return True
return f"{SENTINEL}-{name}"
def full_connection(schema: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {name: value_for(name, spec) for name, spec in (schema.get("properties") or {}).items()}
def secret_values(schema: Dict[str, Any]) -> List[str]:
"""The sent values that must never come back: those of fields marked secret (`writeOnly`).
A tool may repeat a base URL or a region. If the server marks no field secret, every value is
treated as one, because then nothing says which are safe to repeat.
"""
connection = full_connection(schema)
properties = schema.get("properties") or {}
marked = [n for n, spec in properties.items() if spec.get("writeOnly")]
return [str(connection[n]) for n in (marked or list(properties))]
def repeated(response: httpx.Response, schema: Dict[str, Any]) -> List[str]:
return [v for v in secret_values(schema) if v in response.text]
def _string_values(node: Any) -> List[str]:
"""Every string anywhere in a JSON value."""
if isinstance(node, str):
return [node]
if isinstance(node, dict):
return [v for item in node.values() for v in _string_values(item)]
if isinstance(node, list):
return [v for item in node for v in _string_values(item)]
return []
def call(client: httpx.Client, tool: str, connection: Optional[Dict[str, Any]], arguments: Optional[Dict] = None):
return rpc(client, "tools/call", with_connection({"name": tool, "arguments": arguments or {}}, connection))
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ fixtures
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def client():
with httpx.Client(base_url=BASE_URL, timeout=30.0) as session:
try:
session.get("/health")
except httpx.HTTPError as error:
pytest.exit(f"Cannot reach the server at {BASE_URL}: {error}. Start it, or set MCP_SERVER_URL.", 2)
yield session
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def initialize(client) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return result_of(client, "initialize", {"protocolVersion": "1.0.0", "clientInfo": {"name": "conformance"}})
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def tools(client) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
return result_of(client, "tools/list")["tools"]
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def schema(initialize) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
return (initialize.get("_meta") or {}).get(SCHEMA_KEY)
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def needs_connection(schema) -> Dict[str, Any]:
if not schema or not schema.get("properties"):
pytest.skip("the server advertises no connection fields, so it takes no per-request credentials")
return schema
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def probe_tool(initialize, tools) -> str:
"""The tool to call in the connection checks: the verify tool when there is one."""
verify = (initialize.get("_meta") or {}).get(VERIFY_TOOL_KEY)
if verify:
return verify
assert tools, "the server lists no tools to call"
return tools[0]["name"]
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ protocol
def test_health_answers(client):
assert client.get("/health").status_code == 200
def test_the_public_auth_endpoint_reveals_no_key(client):
response = client.get("/.well-known/mcp-auth")
if response.status_code == 404:
pytest.skip("the server has no /.well-known/mcp-auth endpoint")
assert response.status_code == 200
if API_KEY:
# A value that equals the key is always a leak. A short key can also appear inside ordinary words
# ("nc" in "auth_required"), so searching the text for it is only meaningful for a real-length key.
assert API_KEY not in _string_values(response.json()), "/.well-known/mcp-auth returns the server's key"
if len(API_KEY) >= 12:
assert API_KEY not in response.text, "/.well-known/mcp-auth returns the server's key"
def test_a_call_without_the_servers_key_is_refused(client):
response = rpc(client, "tools/list", headers={})
assert response.status_code in (401, 403), f"answered HTTP {response.status_code} to a caller with no key"
def test_a_call_with_the_wrong_key_is_refused(client):
response = rpc(client, "tools/list", headers=auth_headers("not-the-key-" + uuid.uuid4().hex))
assert response.status_code in (401, 403), f"answered HTTP {response.status_code} to a caller with the wrong key"
def test_initialize_describes_the_server(initialize):
assert initialize["serverInfo"]["name"]
assert isinstance(initialize.get("capabilities"), dict)
def test_tools_have_a_name_a_description_and_an_object_schema(tools):
assert isinstance(tools, list)
names = [t["name"] for t in tools]
assert len(names) == len(set(names)), "two tools share a name"
for tool in tools:
assert tool["name"] and tool.get("description"), f"tool {tool.get('name')!r} lacks a name or description"
assert tool["inputSchema"]["type"] == "object", f"{tool['name']} has no object inputSchema"
@pytest.mark.parametrize("request_id", ["conformance-1", 7])
def test_the_reply_echoes_the_request_id(client, request_id):
response = rpc(client, "tools/list", request_id=request_id)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json()["id"] == request_id
def test_an_unknown_method_is_an_error_not_a_crash(client):
response = rpc(client, "no/such/method")
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json().get("error"), "an unknown method returned no error"
def test_an_unknown_tool_is_an_error_not_a_crash(client):
response = rpc(client, "tools/call", {"name": f"no_such_tool_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}", "arguments": {}})
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json().get("error"), "an unknown tool returned no error"
def test_arguments_that_are_not_an_object_are_the_callers_mistake(client, tools, schema):
params = {"name": tools[0]["name"], "arguments": ["not", "an", "object"]}
# With a connection, when the server wants one: a refusal for lacking it would answer -32602 too
response = rpc(client, "tools/call", with_connection(params, full_connection(schema) if schema else None))
assert response.status_code == 200
error = response.json().get("error")
assert error and error.get("code") == -32602, f"expected invalid params (-32602), got: {response.text[:300]}"
def test_an_invalid_request_does_not_repeat_what_it_carried():
# No "id": the request is not valid JSON-RPC, and what it carried (a connection) must not come back.
# It has a connection of its own: a server that answers a bad request by dropping the connection (an
# unhandled error makes uvicorn do that) must not make the NEXT check fail with "connection reset".
marker = f"{SENTINEL}-carried"
try:
response = httpx.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/messages",
json={"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "tools/list", "params": {"_meta": {CONNECTION_KEY: {"field": marker}}}},
headers=auth_headers(),
timeout=30.0,
)
except httpx.TransportError:
return # nothing came back, so nothing was repeated
assert marker not in response.text, "the reply to an invalid request repeated the request"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ connection
def test_the_connection_schema_is_a_json_schema_object(needs_connection):
assert needs_connection["type"] == "object"
properties = needs_connection["properties"]
assert isinstance(properties, dict) and properties
assert set(needs_connection.get("required", [])) <= set(properties), "a required field is not a property"
def test_the_verify_tool_is_listed(initialize, tools, needs_connection):
verify = (initialize.get("_meta") or {}).get(VERIFY_TOOL_KEY)
assert verify, f"initialize does not name a verify tool in _meta[{VERIFY_TOOL_KEY!r}]"
assert verify in [t["name"] for t in tools], f"the verify tool {verify!r} is not in tools/list"
def test_a_call_with_no_connection_is_refused(client, needs_connection, probe_tool):
if not EXPECT_FAIL_CLOSED:
pytest.skip("CONFORMANCE_EXPECT_FAIL_CLOSED=false")
response = call(client, probe_tool, None)
assert response.json().get("error"), (
"a call with no connection was served. The server is using its own environment for the "
"upstream account, so every tenant would share one. Refuse it (REQUIRE_VAULT_CONNECTION)."
)
def test_a_connection_in_the_arguments_is_not_accepted(client, needs_connection, probe_tool):
"""The credential travels in `_meta`, which the model never sees; one in `arguments` is not one."""
if not EXPECT_FAIL_CLOSED:
pytest.skip("CONFORMANCE_EXPECT_FAIL_CLOSED=false")
response = call(client, probe_tool, None, arguments=full_connection(needs_connection))
assert response.json().get("error"), "a connection passed as tool arguments was accepted"
assert not repeated(response, needs_connection), "the reply repeats a credential that was sent as an argument"
def test_a_call_with_a_connection_is_not_refused_for_lacking_one(client, needs_connection, probe_tool):
response = call(client, probe_tool, full_connection(needs_connection))
assert response.status_code == 200
error = response.json().get("error") or {}
message = str(error.get("message", "")).lower()
assert "no connection" not in message and "missing" not in message, (
f"a complete connection was refused as incomplete: {error}"
)
def test_an_incomplete_connection_names_what_is_missing(client, needs_connection, probe_tool):
required = list(needs_connection.get("required", []))
if not required:
pytest.skip("no field is required")
connection = full_connection(needs_connection)
dropped = required[-1]
connection.pop(dropped)
if not connection:
# The only field is required, and an empty connection counts as none. Send one that has a value
# but not the field, which is what a mistyped field name in the credential looks like.
connection = {"not_a_field_of_this_server": "x"}
response = call(client, probe_tool, connection)
error = response.json().get("error")
assert error, f"a connection without the required field {dropped!r} was served"
assert dropped in str(error.get("message", "")), f"the refusal does not name the missing field {dropped!r}: {error}"
assert not repeated(response, needs_connection), "the refusal repeats a credential value"
def test_no_reply_repeats_the_credential(client, needs_connection, probe_tool, tools):
connection = full_connection(needs_connection)
replies = [call(client, probe_tool, connection)]
for tool in tools[:5]:
replies.append(call(client, tool["name"], connection, arguments={"conformance": "probe"}))
replies.append(call(client, "no_such_tool", connection))
for response in replies:
assert not repeated(response, needs_connection), f"a reply repeats the credential: {response.text[:300]}"
def test_a_malformed_connection_is_no_better_than_none(client, needs_connection, probe_tool):
if not EXPECT_FAIL_CLOSED:
pytest.skip("CONFORMANCE_EXPECT_FAIL_CLOSED=false")
for bad in ("just-a-string", ["a", "list"], 42):
params = {"name": probe_tool, "arguments": {}, "_meta": {CONNECTION_KEY: bad}}
body = rpc(client, "tools/call", params).json()
assert body.get("error"), f"a connection of type {type(bad).__name__} was served"
def test_resources_and_prompts_are_listed_when_advertised(client, initialize):
capabilities = initialize.get("capabilities") or {}
if capabilities.get("resources"):
assert isinstance(result_of(client, "resources/list")["resources"], list)
if capabilities.get("prompts"):
assert isinstance(result_of(client, "prompts/list")["prompts"], list)