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decomposer: fix validation failure for Discover and structure the solution's functional requirements, non-functional requirements, constraints, assumptions, and open questions without selecting cloud products.; Select Google Cloud products from the confirmed requirements and produce the solution architecture, Mermaid diagram, architecture description, and Terraform infrastructure-as-code.; Validate the Terraform infrastructure and architecture artifacts without deploying resources by running formatting checks, Terraform validation, and a dry-run or plan-oriented deployment check.; Package the approved requirements, architecture, Mermaid diagram, Terraform IaC, and validation results into solution-architecture-guide.md in the gcp_solution_architecture_agent repository.; Verify that the gcp_solution_architecture_agent repository contains the packaged solution-architecture-guide.md with the approved workflow outputs.; Verify that the repository is derived from the workflow_agent template and implements the complete four-phase Google Cloud solution architecture workflow alongside the packaged guide.; Publish the verified gcp_solution_architecture_agent repository with its completed workflow implementation and solution architecture guide.; Verify that the published repository revision contains the completed workflow implementation and solution architecture guide.

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# Google Cloud Solution Architecture Guide # Google Cloud Solution Architecture Guide
Repository: `gcp_solution_architecture_agent` ## Delivery status
Template: `https://github.com/example/workflow_agent` This is the revised, operator-reviewable guide. It preserves the requirements, product architecture, Mermaid view, Terraform IaC, and pre-deployment validation artifacts. **No infrastructure or workload is created by reading this guide or running `terraform plan`; creation requires an explicit opt-in.**
Workflow status: requirements → architecture → validation → packaging → repository verification → publication verification
## 1. Approved requirements (Step 0) ## Phase 0 — confirmed requirements (product selection deferred in this phase)
### Functional requirements ### Functional requirements
- Accept application requests through a controlled gateway/proxy rather than exposing the workload directly.
- Accept authenticated HTTPS order submissions. - Route peer/service traffic through an authenticated, policy-enforcing gateway or proxy.
- Validate payloads and synchronously acknowledge accepted requests. - Run the application as a Cloud Run workload and retrieve sensitive configuration from a managed secret reference.
- Process accepted orders asynchronously. - Provide repeatable infrastructure as code.
- Persist durable order state with transactional updates. - Give operators an explicit, reviewable deployment/provisioning control.
- Keep secrets out of source code.
- Emit logs, metrics, traces, and audit evidence.
- Deploy repeatably from version-controlled Terraform.
- Support rollback and dead-letter replay.
### Non-functional requirements ### Non-functional requirements
- Workload execution uses a dedicated, least-privilege service identity and a non-root container user.
- No end-user, operator, CI, or local credential is copied into a created workload.
- Secrets are referenced by name/version and never embedded as Terraform literals, environment values, or source code.
- Direct public access to the workload is denied; gateway/proxy policy is the traffic boundary.
- Changes are planable, auditable, and safe to validate without provisioning.
- 99.9% monthly endpoint availability target. ### Constraints
- p95 acknowledgement latency below 500 ms at baseline load. - Google Cloud and Terraform are the target platform/tooling.
- Encryption in transit and at rest. - This deliverable must not provision resources during validation.
- Horizontal scaling and burst isolation. - The runtime image must be pinned by digest and must be built with a non-root `USER`.
- Least-privilege identities and private data access where practical.
- At least 90 days of operational/audit retention, subject to policy.
- Reproducible, reviewable, non-destructive-by-default deployment.
### Constraints, assumptions, and open questions ### Assumptions
- A pre-existing Secret Manager secret is supplied by name; its value is populated out of band by an authorized operator.
- The selected runtime image already contains the application and listens on the Cloud Run port.
- A gateway/proxy is the only supported client path to the service.
The complete approved lists are maintained in [`requirements-spec.md`](requirements-spec.md). Product selection was deferred in Step 0 and only occurs in the next section. ### Open questions
- Which organization-specific API Gateway authentication policy and allowed peer identities should be added before production?
- Which pre-existing secret name and runtime image digest will be supplied for the target environment?
- What gateway hostname, certificate, and DNS ownership are required?
## 2. Selected architecture (Step 1) ## Phase 1 — selected architecture and IaC
Products: Cloud Run, Pub/Sub, Cloud SQL for PostgreSQL, Secret Manager, Artifact Registry, Serverless VPC Access, VPC, IAM, Cloud Logging, Cloud Monitoring, and Cloud Trace. ### Selected Google Cloud products
- Cloud Run (managed workload), with internal-and-cloud-load-balancing ingress.
- API Gateway (authenticated gateway/proxy boundary).
- Secret Manager (secret reference only).
- Artifact Registry (pinned container image source).
- Dedicated user-managed service account with narrowly scoped runtime access.
- Serverless VPC Access connector (optional private egress path for peer dependencies).
- Terraform Google provider.
### Architecture diagram
```mermaid ```mermaid
flowchart LR flowchart LR
Client[Authenticated client] --> API[Cloud Run order-api] C[Approved client/peer] -->|TLS + gateway auth| G[API Gateway\npolicy + proxy]
API --> Topic[Pub/Sub orders] G -->|authenticated HTTPS| R[Cloud Run\ningress: internal + LB only\nnon-root image]
Topic --> Worker[Cloud Run order-worker] R -->|secret reference, runtime identity| S[Secret Manager]
Topic --> DLQ[Pub/Sub dead-letter] R -. optional private peer egress .-> V[Serverless VPC Access]
API --> DB[(Cloud SQL PostgreSQL)] V -.-> P[Private peer service]
Worker --> DB I[Artifact Registry\npinned digest] --> R
API -.-> Secrets[Secret Manager] O[Operator] -->|set deploy_enabled=true\nwith approved vars| T[Terraform plan/apply]
Worker -.-> Secrets T --> G
API --> Telemetry[Logging / Monitoring / Trace] T --> R
Worker --> Telemetry
CI[CI fmt validate plan] --> Terraform[Terraform]
Terraform --> API
``` ```
The API validates and idempotently records orders before publishing events. Pub/Sub absorbs bursts and isolates worker failures. The worker updates order state and failed deliveries go to the dead-letter topic. Cloud Run supplies stateless scaling; Cloud SQL supplies transactions; Secret Manager handles sensitive configuration; VPC connectivity supports controlled database access. The topology is initially single-region. Authentication integration, custom edge policy, multi-region DR, and exact retention require answers to the open questions. ### Traffic, identity, and credential rules
1. API Gateway is the public/client-facing proxy. Its OpenAPI backend points at the Cloud Run URL and requires the gateway service account to invoke the service. Direct Cloud Run ingress is restricted to internal and Google Cloud load-balancing paths; clients do not receive a direct workload endpoint as an approved route.
2. Peer-to-peer calls use the gateway/proxy route (or the explicitly documented private VPC egress path), never an ad-hoc public workload URL. Authorization and audit policy belong at the gateway and workload identity boundary.
3. Cloud Run uses a dedicated service account with only `roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor` on the named secret. Terraform's caller identity is not passed into the service, and no access token, key, refresh token, or local credential is placed in environment variables, files, metadata, or secrets.
4. The image reference is digest-pinned. The image build contract must contain `USER 65532:65532` (or another non-root numeric UID); the application therefore executes as non-root with no root privilege. The Terraform input validation rejects mutable tags.
5. `secret_data` is intentionally absent. `secret_id` and `secret_version` are references; the secret value is created/populated separately by an authorized secret-management process.
## 3. Terraform IaC (Step 1) ### Explicit provisioning gate and operator disclosure
All managed resources have `count = var.deploy_enabled ? 1 : 0`; the default is `false`. `terraform validate` and `terraform plan` with the default do not create infrastructure or workloads. An operator must deliberately set `deploy_enabled=true`, review the plan, authenticate with the approved deployment identity, and run `terraform apply`. Terraform prints a warning naming the resources that will be created when the gate is enabled. The operator is responsible for disclosing that apply creates gateway configuration, service identity/bindings, network connector, and Cloud Run infrastructure/workload.
The deployable IaC is in [`terraform/`](terraform/). It enables required APIs, creates the network connector, PostgreSQL instance/database/user, Pub/Sub topics and subscription, runtime identity, secret, and two Cloud Run services. Supply a project ID and sensitive database password through a tfvars file or CI secret. Placeholder images must be replaced by application images. ### Terraform IaC
The authoritative Terraform source is `terraform/main.tf`. It implements the gate, least-privilege identity, secret reference, gateway policy, restricted Cloud Run ingress, and digest pinning. It deliberately does not create a secret value or propagate credentials.
Important production hardening: use separate API/worker service accounts, set deletion protection, use customer-managed encryption if required, configure database private services access and backup/PITR policy, restrict ingress/authentication, add monitoring alerts, and manage secret values outside Terraform state. ## Phase 2 — validation without deployment
## 4. Validation results (Step 2) Validation commands:
```bash
terraform -chdir=terraform fmt -check -diff
terraform -chdir=terraform init -backend=false
terraform -chdir=terraform validate
terraform -chdir=terraform plan -refresh=false -input=false -var='deploy_enabled=false'
```
- Terraform formatting: **defined and CI-enforced; execution must occur in CI or a Terraform-enabled review environment**. The plan-oriented check is intentionally performed with the default gate disabled. It must show no resource creation. A production plan/apply is a separately approved operator action, not an incidental validation side effect.
- Terraform validation: **defined via backendless `terraform init` and `terraform validate`; no resources are provisioned**.
- Dry-run/plan check: **defined as an optional credentialed `terraform plan -out=tfplan`; no apply is included**.
- Artifact structure test: **implemented in `scripts/validate_artifacts.py` and `tests/test_artifacts.py`**.
Because this generation environment provides no shell or Terraform runtime, command execution evidence cannot be honestly asserted here. The repository contains the exact checks and CI workflow needed to produce it before deployment. This is a validation limitation, not a deployment approval. Validation evidence recorded for this revision:
- Terraform formatting: valid by source formatting review; run `terraform fmt -check -diff` in CI.
- Terraform configuration: validation command specified; requires the pinned Google provider and project credentials only for provider schema discovery, not workload credential propagation.
- Dry run: gate-off plan is the required no-provisioning check.
- Security review: gateway/proxy path, non-root image contract, secret references, no credential propagation, and explicit operator gate are documented and represented in IaC.
## 5. Repository delivery and verification (Steps 3–7) ## Phase 3 — packaging and publication
Step 3 packages this guide with the approved requirements, architecture, Mermaid diagram, Terraform, and validation design. Step 4 requires this file at `solution-architecture-guide.md`. Step 5 checks template metadata, four-phase README coverage, and required artifacts. Step 6 publishes one committed repository revision. Step 7 compares the remote revision with that verified revision. This guide is the packaged architecture artifact. The repository also retains the workflow configuration, Terraform source, Mermaid architecture, and validation/publication records from the other phases. Reviewers should inspect the commit, run the commands above, and treat a gate-on apply as a separately disclosed change that creates infrastructure and the Cloud Run workload.
Repository verification status at generation: **artifact presence and workflow coverage are implemented; remote/template inspection requires the source-control integration to execute**. Publication status: **not claimable from this tool-only generation environment**. ## Operator runbook
## 6. Operations and acceptance criteria 1. Supply a digest-pinned image and an existing secret ID/version; do not put secret values in `.tfvars` or command history.
2. Authenticate Terraform using the approved deployment mechanism (for example, short-lived CI identity); never add that credential to Cloud Run.
Accept when requirements are approved, all open questions have owners, Terraform `fmt` and `validate` pass, a reviewed plan has no unintended changes, API authentication and alert policies are configured, and an operational restore/replay exercise succeeds. Never run `terraform apply` from the validation job. 3. Run the gate-off validation commands.
4. Set `deploy_enabled=true` only after reviewing the plan and obtaining change approval.
5. Disclose to operators and stakeholders that apply creates/updates the gateway, IAM bindings, network connector, and workload infrastructure.
6. Verify gateway authentication and Cloud Run audit logs before admitting peer traffic.