feat: the solution architecture agent on the shared Execution engine
The reference agent's subject, cloud solution architecture, as an agent in the operating model agent's pattern: the Execution engine (from orchestration_engine) and one Workflow in app/solution_architecture, built for the settings and provider bundle by assembly.workflow_for. Copied from gcp_solution_architecture_agent at 8b397cd without its own engine: its role files, Skills, provider bundle, ADRs, vocabulary, scripts and evaluation datasets. The image takes the engine from a named build context and installs Terraform. It is called through the Orchestration engine, and its files are what the operating model agent digests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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# Remote MCP access: Google Cloud
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How to give the solution architect agent safe, read-only access to Google Cloud's hosted MCP servers. The servers the agent uses, and the only tools it may call on each, are listed in [`providers/gcp.yaml`](../../providers/gcp.yaml).
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## How the agent limits itself
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- **Allowlist.** An agent is only ever offered tools named in a server's `allow` list. Every other tool on the server is invisible to it.
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- **Read-only check at startup.** If any allowlisted tool doesn't declare `readOnlyHint: true`, the agent refuses to start.
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- **Content excluded.** Tools that return data content are excluded even though they are read-only: Cloud SQL `execute_sql_readonly`, Cloud Storage `read_object`/`read_text`/`list_objects`, and generic Kubernetes reads that can return Secrets (`get_k8s_resource`, `describe_k8s_resource`).
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- **Permission per Execution.** Tools that read your environment (`cloud_read`) run only after the user grants permission in that Execution. Pre-approved Executions deny it unless the caller passes `allow_cloud_read=true`, in the request or in the scope spec's `run` section. When it is denied, the cloud-read tools are not offered to the agents at all.
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- **Replies are checked.** When Jev is configured, a server's reply that reads as instructions to the agent, as opposed to information, is withheld from the Specialist and logged (`JEV_GUARDRAIL`). Without Jev, replies pass through.
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These are defence in depth. Enforce read-only access in Google Cloud as well.
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## Set up a project the agent may read
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1. **Enable the APIs** of the products you want discovered. A product's MCP endpoint is available once its API is enabled, for example `compute.googleapis.com`, `container.googleapis.com`, `run.googleapis.com`, `sqladmin.googleapis.com`, `pubsub.googleapis.com`, `cloudasset.googleapis.com`, `monitoring.googleapis.com` and `networkmanagement.googleapis.com`. A disabled API shows up as a recorded discovery gap, not a failure.
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2. **Create a dedicated service account** for the agent, and grant it only:
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- `roles/mcp.toolUser`, to call MCP tools
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- `roles/viewer`, or narrower viewer roles for the products in scope
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- `roles/cloudasset.viewer`, for asset inventory and IAM analysis
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3. **Deny read-write tool calls** for every principal with an IAM deny policy. Save the policy as `policy.json`:
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```json
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{
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"rules": [
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{
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"denyRule": {
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"deniedPrincipals": ["principalSet://goog/public:all"],
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"deniedPermissions": ["mcp.googleapis.com/tools.call"],
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"denialCondition": {
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"title": "Deny read-write tools",
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"expression": "api.getAttribute('mcp.googleapis.com/tool.isReadOnly', false) == false"
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}
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}
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}
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]
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}
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```
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Then attach it to the project:
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```bash
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gcloud iam policies create mcp-deny-policy \
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--attachment-point=cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com/projects/PROJECT_ID \
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--kind=denypolicies \
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--policy-file=policy.json
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```
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4. **Give the agent credentials.** It authenticates with Application Default Credentials: the attached service account on Cloud Run or GKE, or `GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS` locally. Set `MCP_QUOTA_PROJECT` when quota should be charged to a project other than the credentials' project.
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For local development, `gcloud auth application-default login` supplies ADC for your user.
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## Reviewing the allowlists
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Upstream tool sets change. To review them:
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1. Refresh the snapshot. `tools/list` works without credentials, and the script lists tools without calling any:
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```bash
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.venv/bin/python scripts/list-mcp-tools.py gcp --json --no-auth > providers/reviews/gcp-mcp-tools.json
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```
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2. Read the diff. For each new read-only tool, decide whether it returns inventory or configuration metadata (allow it) or data content or secrets (leave it out).
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3. Update the `allow` lists in `providers/gcp.yaml`. `tests/test_providers.py` fails if an allowlisted tool is missing from the snapshot or isn't read-only.
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Last reviewed 2026-09-16, against all 12 servers.
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