# Verification report

## Generation-time result

The repository-generation interface used to produce this artifact did not expose a shell, Docker daemon, or command runner. Consequently **no formatter, linter, type checker, test, image build, container startup, or smoke command was executed during generation**. There is intentionally no fabricated console output. Presence of configuration is not reported as execution.

## Validator-accessible commands

From a Python 3.12 environment:

```sh
pip install -e '.[dev]'
ruff format --check .
ruff check .
mypy app
pytest -q
```

Container validation:

```sh
docker build -t endpoint-monitor:verify .
docker run --rm -d --name endpoint-monitor-verify -p 18000:8000 endpoint-monitor:verify
until curl --fail --silent http://127.0.0.1:18000/readyz; do sleep 1; done
curl --fail --silent http://127.0.0.1:18000/healthz
curl --fail --silent -X POST http://127.0.0.1:18000/v1/monitors \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"name":"example","url":"https://example.com"}'
docker rm -f endpoint-monitor-verify
```

## Coverage inventory

The committed tests visibly cover CRUD and operational routes; concurrent repository creates; stale update/delete compare-and-set behavior; status/latency and timeout mapping; private and mixed DNS answers; private redirect destinations and redirect limits; unsafe API error/status behavior; and structured-log URL credential/query/fragment redaction. All outbound checker tests use `httpx.MockTransport`.

## Operational limitation

The service is process-local and volatile. Validation with multiple workers would not establish shared-state correctness because the design intentionally has none; use one worker. Application DNS checks reduce SSRF risk but should be paired with network egress controls to address resolver/client TOCTOU and rebinding at a hard boundary.