1.8 KiB
Verification report
Generation-time result
The repository-generation interface used to produce this artifact did not expose a shell, Docker daemon, or command runner. Consequently no formatter, linter, type checker, test, image build, container startup, or smoke command was executed during generation. There is intentionally no fabricated console output. Presence of configuration is not reported as execution.
Validator-accessible commands
From a Python 3.12 environment:
pip install -e '.[dev]'
ruff format --check .
ruff check .
mypy app
pytest -q
Container validation:
docker build -t endpoint-monitor:verify .
docker run --rm -d --name endpoint-monitor-verify -p 18000:8000 endpoint-monitor:verify
until curl --fail --silent http://127.0.0.1:18000/readyz; do sleep 1; done
curl --fail --silent http://127.0.0.1:18000/healthz
curl --fail --silent -X POST http://127.0.0.1:18000/v1/monitors \
-H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"name":"example","url":"https://example.com"}'
docker rm -f endpoint-monitor-verify
Coverage inventory
The committed tests visibly cover CRUD and operational routes; concurrent repository creates; stale update/delete compare-and-set behavior; status/latency and timeout mapping; private and mixed DNS answers; private redirect destinations and redirect limits; unsafe API error/status behavior; and structured-log URL credential/query/fragment redaction. All outbound checker tests use httpx.MockTransport.
Operational limitation
The service is process-local and volatile. Validation with multiple workers would not establish shared-state correctness because the design intentionally has none; use one worker. Application DNS checks reduce SSRF risk but should be paired with network egress controls to address resolver/client TOCTOU and rebinding at a hard boundary.